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FOREWORD
In 1985 the University of Zimbabwe and Michigan State University initiated a Food 
Security Research Network for Southern Africa. The objectives of the network are 
to conduct research that informs policymakers about food security issues and to help 
strengthen the regional capacity for food policy analyis. The underlying premise of 
the network is that building excellence in research capacity for national policy 
analysis comes through experience. In practice, this requires a long-term 
commitment to analytical capacity building, consistency in funding, and constant 
interaction between researchers and policymakers.
The network has sponsored four annual conferences for network researchers, 
policymakers, SADCC officials, and representative of international and donor 
agencies. The aim of the conference is to share research findings, identify new 
research themes, and provide an opportunity for policy dialogue between regional 
researchers, policymakers, and government officials.
The 1988 conference brought together 110 participants who deliberated on 28 
papers. In the Official Opening, Vice-Chancellor W J. Kamba of the Univesity of 
Zimbbawe highlighted the importance of including health related-issues as a 
component of food security; and Zimbabwe’s Senior Minister of Finance, Economic 
Planning, and Development B.T.G. Chidzero outlined policy reform priorities for 
Southern Africa. Subsequent sessions focused on SADCC’s Food Security 
Programme, the Impact o f Market Reform on Food Security, Food Security Policy 
Options, New Technology to Improve Food Security, Family Food Security Options in 
Low-Rainfall Areas, ExpandingAgricultural Trade in the SADCC Region, Nutrition and 
Food Security, the Contribution o f Small-Scale Rural Enterprises to Employment 
Generation and Food Security, and the Impact o f Irrigation on Food Security.
A  highlight of the 1988 conference was the participation of five nutritionists from 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Sweden, and the United States. The presence of the 
nutritionists stimulated formal and informal discussions on the food access side of 
the food security equation and drew attention to the need to initiate more research 
in this area.
A second highlight of the 198» conference was the attention given to reducing 
barriers to expanded intraregional trade in the SADCC region. Results presented 
suggest that there appear to be substantial price and nonprice barriers to expanded 
trade. Nevertheless, there exist significant opportunities for expanding intraregional 
trade that can be realized through appropriate government initiatives.
This proceeding contains revised papers prepared under the sponsorship of the 
University of Zimbabwe/Michigan State University Food Security Research Project 
in Southern Africa and presented at the University of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Annual 
Conference on Food Security Research in Southern Africa, held at the Holiday Inn, 
Harare, October 31-November 3, 1988.
Godfrey Mudimu and Richard H. Bernsten 
Co-Directors
UZ/M SU Food Security Research Project 
University of Zimbabwe
PAN-TERRITORIAL AND PAN-SEASONAL 
PRICING FOR MAIZE IN ZIMBABWE
Kay Muir and Tobias Takavarasha1
INTRODUCTION
Agricultural prices are seldom left to the marker mechanism, regardless of the 
political system or level of development. This intervention in the price which would 
be established by unfettered supply and demand is motivated by more than existing 
market imperfections. The biological nature of the agricultural production process 
is a major factor in government intervention. Actual and planned supply are rarely 
the same; there are significant lags between the planning of production and the 
eventual supply of the commodity. Prices are unstable both within and between 
seasons and may involve cycles which move away from, rather than towards 
equilibrium—even under conditions of perfect competition. The situation is 
aggravated by the fact that because most agricultural commodities are necessities, 
they have a relatively inelastic demand. This means that fluctuations in supply will 
result in more than proportionate fluctuations in price. Much of the intervention is 
thus aimed at stabilising domestic supplies and prices. Food security, income 
redistribution, and reallocation of resources are other major objectives.
Government intervention in agricultural pricing can essentially be categorised 
either as consumer or producer oriented. In the former, the objective is to keep 
food prices down, and in this way agriculture is ‘taxed’ and resources are transferred 
to other sectors-which has happened in many developing countries. In the latter, 
prices are raised to increase farm incomes. This broadly is the position in the 
European Community, where a battery of supports keeps agricultural producer 
prices well above their market levels. These distortions have a major impact on 
world prices, which in turn affect price determination in developing countries.
The national development objectives of the Zimbabwe government are laid out 
in a number of policy documents. "The central objectives arc to foster rapid 
economic growth, full employment, dynamic efficiency in resource allocation, and an 
equitable distribution of the ensuing benefits" (Zimbabwe, 1981, p.l). Government 
is in the process of complying with the provision in the Transitional National 
Development Plan to undertake a comprehensive examination and review of 
agricultural pricing with a view to developing a pricing policy which effectively and 
equitably promotes growth, development of the communal areas, food self- 
sufficiency, regional security, and efficient land use and development. Conflicts arc 
inherent in some of these objectives and it is the role of the policy analyst to 
determine the trade-offs.
Zimbabwe has very high bridging costs to and from international markets and 
regional markets for maize arc limited. Maize is the staple food and the most
Department of Agricultural Ixonomics and Intension. University of Zimbabwe and Chief 
Agricultural liconomisl, Ministry of l^tnds. Agriculture and Rural Rcscttclmcnt, Harare, respectively.
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widely-grown crop. The extreme variability of maize yields and the very high 
differential between export and import parity mean that free market conditions 
would result in unacceptably high market risks for producers and unacceptable price 
fluctuations for consumers. Any government intervention to reduce these 
fluctuations will have associated costs. National buffer stocks, imports, and 
artificially-determined prices incur trade-offs between conflicting objectives. In order 
to ensure rational policy decisions, it is essential that the impacts of a particular 
policy are measured against each major objective.
A REVIEW OF PRICE SETTING POLICY 
SETTING IN ZIMBABWE
Historical background
Direct government intervention in agricultural marketing was initiated in 1931 in 
response to the world depression which seriously undermined the financial viability 
of the maize industry which relied on exports. The Maize Control Board was 
established to stabilize the industry and relied on local consumers to subsidise 
producers. The era also saw the commencement of racial discrimination in 
marketing. Maize from communal lands was only allowed access to the lower-priced 
export markets (Muir-Leresche, 1984).
Producer prices were fixed according to a basic price agreed between government 
and the National Farmers Union, with annual adjustments made on the basis of 
changes in a production cost index. This cost-plus pricing system, together with the 
introduction of high-yielding maize varieties during the 1950s, culminated in 
overproduction by the end of that decade with surpluses being sold at a loss. As a 
result, the pricing agreement was dispensed with in 1962. Since then, maize prices 
have been adjusted annually by government in consultation with the relevant 
marketing boards and producer representatives.
-By 1970 government prescribed producer prices for maize, groundnuts, sorghum, 
cotton, wheat, soybeans, coffee, beef, and milk. Sunflowers and millets became 
controlled crops in 1983 and 1984, respectively. The degree of monopsony control 
varies. Whilst there is legislated monopsony control on all cotton, the Grain 
Marketing Board (GMB) has monopsony control between communal areas and in 
all designated areas outside them (Zone A). In Zone B, the communal areas (and 
low-output commercial areas), free trade is permited within the boundaries of each 
area, but the commodities may not cross zone boundaries. This was established to 
encourage communal areas to be self-sufficient, but to retain control of all exchanges 
with the formal sector and urban areas and has effectively limited exchanges between 
surplus and deficit communal areas, unless they have contiguous boundaries.
The government allocation to agriculture includes financing to cover agricultural 
marketing board deficits. In many instances, these deficits are the result of low 
selling prices and are effectively consumer subsidies rather than agricultural supports. 
However, some of the subsidies do result from various direct and indirect producer 
price supports and it is to a clearer analysis of these policy interventions that this
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paper is directed. The annual marketing board subsidies given in Table 1 are a 
significant proportion of the total budget allocated to agriculture. In 1982-83 
agriculture was allocated 5%  of total government expenditure of which subsidies 
(predominantly for consumers and a few large-scale producers) accounted for over 
half of this vote—leaving only 2.35% to finance all extension, research, marketing, 
animal health, tsetse control, and administration of large-scale, small-scale, and 
communal agriculture (Muir-Leresche, 1984).
Price levels have been established around a number of key objectives which 
include achieving self-sufficiency and maximising foreign exchange earnings where 
favorable export markets exist. In the 1970s, cotton and groundnuts were taxed 
relative to opportunity costs; wheat and soybeans were subsidised. This reflected 
self-sufficiency objectives, the bias of the large-farm lobby, and cost of production 
pricing.
Price setting for controlled agricultural commodities in the 1980s has been more 
complicated than in previous decades. The levels of inflation, distorted exchange 
rate, and declining terms of trade have made the setting of the ‘correct’ price levels 
more difficult. Fluctuations in output due to drought and the financial consequences 
of these swings in production have further complicated the process of setting price 
levels (Takavarasha, 1987). Nonetheless, in recent years producer subsidies on wheat 
and soyabeans and taxes on groundnuts and cotton have been reduced, indicating a 
move towards greater efficiency; although maize price setting continues to vary in a 
relatively explosive cycle (Muir and Blackie, 1988).
Current price setting
The formal procedure for setting the price levels of major state-controlled 
agricultural commodities begin with meetings between producer representatives and 
the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA). Budgeted trading accounts and cost
Table 1. Parastatal food marketing boards’ annual deficits (Z$ m illion), Zimbabwe.
Year CSC* DMBt> GMB‘ Total Maized
1981 46.3 18.4 30.7 95.4 20.4
1982 45.3 35.6 58.4 139.3 43.6
1983 45.8 38.6 28.0 112.4 17.0
1984 24.3 463 315 102.1 42.6
1985 27.7 55.6 52.1 135.4 46.3
Totals 189.4 1943 200.7 584.6 169.9
‘Cold Storage Commission, predominantly beef.
'’Diary Marketing Board.
‘Grain Marketing Board; alt food crops including maize, wheat, sorghum, munga, rapoko, groundnuts, 
soyabeans, sunflowers, and coffee.
dMaize is included in the GMB total, but is also shown separately because it is the staple food and 
most widely-produced commodity.
‘Harvest year refers to the 1981-82 marketing year.
Source: Respective marketing boards’ annual reports (various years).
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of production schedules are submitted to the ministry. After a series of meetings 
with marketing and producer representatives, the ministry decides on prices to 
recommend to cabinet. No specific formula or technique is used to set price levels 
and several interrelated factors are considered. Each factor is weighted according 
to the type of commodity being considered so that commodities largely produced for 
export are more closely related to border prices. On the other hand, when 
determining costs of production for maize, wheat, and soybeans, strategic, stockpiles 
and internal selling prices are usually more important than opportunity costs. The 
macroeconomic impact of the recommended producer prices are considered by an 
inter-ministerial working party before cabinet makes a final decision.2
Producer prices are fixed during harvest in April for all commodities (wheat 
being a winter crop is set preplanting). The rationale for postharvest pricing was 
to allow prices to vary with rainfall, but this has not been the practice (Chavanduka, 
1983; and Muir, 1984). The prices are pan-seasonal and apply from April to the 
following March for the entire country. They are pan-territorial prices, effective at 
all designated receiving depots.
IMPACTS OF CURRENT PRICE SETTING
Cost of production approach
In practice, the most influential basis for producer prices has been costs of 
production, in particular those of the commercial farmers. Farm lobbies have been 
important and price negotiations have concentrated on establishing which data sets 
accurately reflect costs. Since independence, however, increasing recognition has 
been given to opportunity costs.
Economic efficiency is seriously affected whenever prices are established on a 
cost-plus basis. The signals which are sent to the industry are to maximise yields, 
regardless of costs. These same signals affect the entire agricultural service industry 
and in particular, the research divisions. Little or no effort is made to find cost- 
reducing technologies. Where input prices are also distorted in favour of capital- 
intensive systems, the effects on economic efficiency (growth) are particularly serious. 
Little attention is given to the most economically efficient farmers or technologies 
in accordance with Zimbabwe’s comparative advantage. All the emphasis is on 
maximising yield or, at best, on technical efficiency. There still remains considerable 
confusion between absolute advantage (environment and skills) and comparative 
advantage which includes demand and price.
To the extent that farmers are able to control producer prices, they will lobby for, 
and favour a cost of production price system. From a national perspective, however, 
it is essential to find an independent basis for judging prices. Yield increases are 
important, but yield increases at any cost are not necessarily desirable. To the
2See Wright and Takavarasha (forthcoming) and Herbst (1988) for details of the price setting 
process in Zimbabwe.
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extent that a national economy can support inefficient producers3, farmers can 
continue to rely on a cost of production pricing mechanism. However, when the 
national economy cannot sustain the support system, attention has to be directed to 
reducing costs of production rather than relying on increased prices and transport 
subsidies.
International markets for most agricultural products are seriously distorted by 
heavy support for the farm communities in most developed countries, especially the 
EEC. This in turn has not only reduced world prices, but has distorted research 
priorities to favour yield-maximising over cost-reducing technologies. In order to 
sustain agriculture in developing countries, it may be necessary to subsidise 
production relative to the distorted world prices. But with the very limited resources 
available, it is essential that any implicit or explicit subsidy is targeted to those 
commodities which will help to maximise growth with equity. These supports should 
avoid sending signals which favour economically inefficient commodities and 
technologies. The current policies appear to have negative consequences for both 
growth and equity, given that officially marketed beef and dairy products are 
produced be a few large-scale farmers and consumed by employed urban households.
Pan-seasonal pricing
The term pan-seasonal pricing is used here to refer to the practice of offering the 
same price to farmers throughout the season. This section seeks to examine the 
major issues which must be considered in testing the hypothesis that raising the 
GMB purchase price at intervals after the harvest period would reduce trading losses 
by encouraging on-farm storage.
Seasonal production creates the need for a marketing system that can store the 
product from a short harvest period to the much longer consumption period. Over 
90% of the GMB maize intake is normally received in five months, June to October, 
while sales are evenly distributed throughout the year. The exact timing of maize 
deliveries will vary from year-to-year depending on seasonal rainfall patterns, 
conditions at harvest, and availability of transport. An additional factor influencing 
the timing of sales is the need for ready cash by peasant farmers (Stanning, 1987).
Climatic variations cause agricultural production to follow certain distinct 
seasonal patterns. Hot, wet conditions are necessary at the planting stage; moisture 
is essential for pollination; while harvesting is best done under dry, sunny conditions. 
Seasonality in agricultural production places high premiums on the timely 
performance of critical tasks such as ploughing, planting, cultivation, and harvesting. 
Significant labour bottlenecks usually occur if certain tasks must be performed very 
quickly at specific times to ensure maximum yields (e.g., weeding). Marketing 
agencies must similarly plan their operations in such a way that produce can be 
handled and transported before the next rains set in.
3 This refers to producers who cannot compete on world markets without subsidies and does not 
mean that the farmers are technically inefficient, given available resources.
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Maize stocks perform a dual purpose: they provide a working stock for annual 
requirements and a reserve for periods of deficit. The rainfall pattern in Zimbabwe 
is capricious and highly seasonal, occuring mainly between November and March. 
Agricultural potential is distributed according to average rainfall variations and 
temperature differences, as depicted by the country’s five natural regions. Total 
rainfall and its distribution during the season are the overriding limiting factors for 
agricultural production (Table 2).
Taking a three-year average (1985-1987), 83% of all maize marketed and 95% 
of maize marketed by the commercial farming sector came from Natural Region 
(NR) II. Although only 8% of the communal lands are in NR II, they contributed 
67% of marketed maize in the period, rising to 85% in 1987 which was a drought 
year. The contribution to maize marketing by communal and small-scale farmers fell 
between 1985 and 1987, but the contribution from those farmers in NR II rose 
steadily (Table 3).
Zimbabwe has experienced extreme variability of rainfall in the years following 
independence. Rainfall was higher than normal throughout most of the country 
during the 1980-81 and 1984-85 cropping seasons, which produced bumper harvests 
and losses on exports. A widespread successive drought occurred for three seasons 
between 1981-82 and 1983-84 causing severe food shortages, especially in calender 
year 1984. There was drought again in 1986-87. Yield variability has been estimated 
by the GMB for both communal and commercial production (Table 4).
The above analysis, notwithstanding the limitations of using aggregated data over 
a brief period, has served to highlight the susceptibility of maize production to 
seasonal variations in yields, especially in the communal sector. Seasonability is 
further aggravated by the unreliability of NR III, IV and V as sources of regular 
marketable maize surpluses.
The relationship between seasonality and food security
Wide fluctuations in production and marketing have simply added to the 
government’s difficulty in stabilising domestic food prices, controlling storage costs, 
and has resulted in stock management problems. Fluctuations in GMB intakes, 
sales, and reserve stocks are shown in Table 5.
The proponents of on-farm storage have shown that decentralised storage is 
cheaper than centralised storage under certain circumstances. Given the 
circumstances in Zimbabwe, however, it would appear that the economies of size of 
centralised storage may outweigh the benfits of on-farm storage, particularly in view 
of the fact that all home consumption is already stored in the communal areas and 
it is only the marketed surplus for deficit and urban areas and for export which is 
centrally stored.
The impact o f pan-seasonal prices on delivery patterns
Grain marketing tends to vary considerably more than production, especially in the 
communal sector where a significant share of food production is consumed directly 
by the farm household. In drought years, net marketings and deliveries to the GMB 
decline proportionately more than production.
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Table 2. Distribution of agricultural land by natural region, Zimbabwe.
Natural
Region
Average
annual
rainfall
(mm)
Large-scale
commercial
(%)
Small-scale
commercial
(%)
Communal
farmers
(%)
Resettlement
faimeis
(%)
I > 1000 3 0 1 2
II 750-1000 30 18 8 20
III 650-1000 16 38 17 37
IV 450-650 23 37 45 38
V < 450 28 7 29 3
100 100 100 100
Table 3. Marketing surplus of maize by natural region and by farming sector, 
Zimbabwe, 1985 to 1987.
Contribution of NR II to: 1985 1986 1987
Total sales (%) 80 86 91
Commercial sector sales (%) 95 95 95
Communal sector sales (%) 61 72 85
Table 4. Yield variability in maize production, Zimbabwe, 1980-88
Commercial area Commercial area
(mt/ha) (mt/ha)
Mean 4.60 0.90
Standard deviation 1.06 0.45
High 5.97 1.71
Lew 2.58 0.29
The persistent instability in production means that to achieve maize self-
sufficiency objectives, the country has relied heavily on large reserve stocks being 
held by the GMB. The main rationale for self-sufficiency includes a consumer 
preference for white maize whicl* is usually only available from South Africa. In 
addition, the high bridging costs and foreign currency constraints make imports 
undesirable. Large centralised storage facilities are necessary in order to maintain 
the required strategic reserve of some 1 million mt (or 1 year’s consumption). 
Keeping such large stocks is expensive (Buccola and Sukume, 1988), but is 
considered the price of national food self-sufficiency.
Table 5. Maize stocks purchases and sales (’0001), Zimbabwe 1980-81 to 1980-87.
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Marketing
year
Opening
stock
Local
purchases
Local
sales
Exports
(imports)
Shrinkage Closing
stock
1980-81 64.8 814.8 716.1 2.9* 2.7 157.9
1981-82 157.9 2,013.8 664.9 305.1 1.1 1,200.7
1982-83 1,200.7 1,391.3 1,046.2 492.0 18.6 1,035.1
1983-84 1,035.1 616.9 1,273.2 252.3 3.8 122.7
1984-85 123.0 942.0 860.0 (269.0) 12.0 462.0
1985-86 462.0 1,828.0 560.0 285.0 13.0 1,432.0
1986-87 1,432.0 1,594.4 713.3 4943 123 1,806.3
‘in the 1980-81 marketing year, 86.3 mt were exported and 83.4 mt were imported. 
Source: Grain Marketing Board, (1988).
Similarly, in good years the percentage increase in marketing is usually 
substantially larger than the percentage increase in production (Stanning, 1987). 
Stanning’s study noted that small farmers have multiple objectives in producing 
grain, but concluded that meeting food requirements takes priority over other 
production goals.
Grain retentions are dictated by farmers’ consumption and sales habits. In 
general, storing grain for household receives priority. In addition, most farmers 
regard it as important to have in store more than they consume during the year 
in case of a bad harvest and also to retain some grain for nonfood purposes such 
as labour payment, exchange, and beer brewing (Stanning, 1987, p.38).
This study showed that in surplus areas, most maize was sold in a single sale two 
to three months after harvest and that only 10% of the population exhausted home 
grain supplies before the next harvest. Local purchases and labour exchanges made 
up most of the deficit. Although GMB has pan-seasonal prices, local prices do vary 
but "farmer behaviour in Urungwe and Bushu implies that the costs of storage 
(losses due to insects and rodents, outlays on buildings), outweights the benefits of 
storage" (ibid, p.52).
Although the exact timing of maize sales varies from year-to-year depending on 
seasonal rainfall patterns, conditions at harvest, and availability of transport; the 
need for ready cash is a major factor affecting timing. For many small farmers, crop 
sales are the main source of cash and, therefore, timing of sales is closely related to 
cash needs. The decisions are unlikely to be affected by incentives offered to 
encourage storage for sales later in the year. Large-scale farmers would be in a 
better position to take advantage of price variations, but this would have a major 
impact on traditional short-term financing.
Introducing price variations to encourage on-farm storage will thus have a very 
limited impact since peasant farmers do not rely on central government to store their 
maize for home consumption—a significant proportion of national production is 
already stored for one season on farms (only 30% of total estimated production in
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the small farm sector was marketed in 1985, some 45% of total GMB intake). Early 
sale of that proportion which is marketed is likely to continue, even with fairly 
considerable price incentives for on-farm storage.
Intraseasonal price variations will, therefore, only affect the large-scale sector. 
If it were in the national interest to stagger deliveries to the GMB, this sector would 
respond—provided the incentives were sufficient to cover cost of storage facilities, 
interest on investment, spoilage risk, and the interest on extended financing of 
variable inputs. Transport currently staggers deliveries to some extent, but all maize 
is usually delivered by August; whereas the peasant sector, which has poorer access 
to transport, continues to deliver much later. The potential moisture spoilage effect 
from large deliveries after the rains have commenced needs to be considered before 
any incentives are offered for deliveries after October. In years when buffer stocks 
are low, price incentives have been offered for early delivery in April and May. 
These incentives have effectively been available to the large-scale sector only because 
of the throughput necessary to warrant investment in artificial drying facilities.
The administrative costs of estimating the necessary variations to elicit desired 
response are high in countries where reliable forecasting models and data do not 
exist. Thus, it would only be worthwhile if the social costs of pan-seasonal prices are 
likely to be considerable. This is unlikely, given that they affect intra rather than 
interseasonal storage and given the existing storage infrastructure in Zimbabwe. 
In most years the GMB prefers to take delivery of the grain as soon as possible after 
harvest so that it can plan effectively and negotiate export or import contracts as 
appropriate.
Pan-territorial pricing
Pan-territorial pricing refers to the uniform depot price paid throughout Zimbabwe. 
Farmers bear the cost of transport to depots, but the marketing parastatals bear all 
transport costs ex depot to zone centres. Millers, processors, and food aid 
organisations bear costs of transport from zone centres. There is a.uniform selling 
price ex zone centre and the retail price of maize meal is controlled throughout the 
country with an insignificant margin allowed for transport. This results in shortages 
in rural areas during deficit years (Child, Muir, and Blackie, 1985) and loss-leader 
or conditional sales when maize is available. This paper, however, concentrates on 
pan-territorial producer prices and does not consider the impacts of uniform selling 
prices.
Uniform depot prices mean that farmers in the more remote surplus regions are 
being subsidised by farmers in deficit regions and by farmers closer to markets. 
Pan-territorial prices are defended on the basis that they increase returns to the 
more isolated areas and thus increase equity. In addition, they are easier to 
administer and appear, superficially, to be more equitable since all farmers are paid 
the same price. The fact that incomes are equal to price times yield appears to be 
ignored.
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Economists agree that uniform prices have a negative impact on economic 
efficiency and thus growth4. Uniform prices are usually supported on equity grounds. 
The thesis of this paper is that pan-territorial prices have a negative impact on both 
growth and equity. Uniform prices infer an implicit transport subsidy which distorts 
resource allocation by encouraging the production of low-value, high-bulk 
commodities in remote regions. This increases demand on an already over-burdened 
transport sector. Deficit regions receive a producer price very much lower than 
those which would obtain under a free-market system (see Figure 1), thus reducing 
incomes in these areas and increasing the transport burden. To the extent that the 
poor are maize producers living in deficit areas, there is a negative impact on equity.5
Theoretical impacts on growth
Uniform prices ignore transport costs, thus distorting comparative advantage and 
resulting in the misallocation of resources. The extent to which resources are 
misallocated depends on the development level of the transport infrastructure and 
the distance from markets. Producers dose to market have an absolute advantage 
in the production of all commodities (assuming similar agronomic conditions), but 
producers further from the market have a comparative advantage in the low-bulk, 
high-value commodities. This is because the transport cost is a smaller proportion 
of the value to weight ratio (e.g., transport costs are 6% of sorghum price and only 
1.5% of groundnut price).
If producer prices ignore transport costs, then they are encouraging remote 
regions to grow high-bulk, low-value commodities while producers close to the 
market are discouraged by the implicit tax. Producers in defidt areas would produce 
more if prices were higher, but with a uniform price they do not receive the 
necessary incentive which means that greater imports to the area are necessary. 
These distortions place an excessive burden on the transport system; increasing the 
demand for transport and thus foreign currency. Where the foreign exchange 
component of transport is estimated at some 70%, the distortion is even greater if 
opportunity cost pricing is used. It is not possible to estimate the actual impact on 
the transport sector since it is difficult to estimate the reduction in production in 
remote surplus areas and the increase in deficit regions or in areas close to the 
market, without reasonably accurate price elasticities of supply.
4 Agronomists usually prefer to see higher prices in agronomically suitable zones in the interests 
of higher national average yields. This would only be economically rational if there was no demand 
for that commodity in deficit areas.
^ h e r e  the poor are involved in purchasing maize, those in surplus areas are negatively affected 
by uniform prices. Theoretically, net maize purchasers in deficit areas benefit from uniform prices 
which keep producer prices low. In fact, in deficit areas local sales are made well above the 
government established price (e.g., In Chivu in 1988, maize was selling for three times the GMB 
purchase price). To some extent, this informal trading offsets the distortions within those areas of the 
uniform price policy.
FIGURE 1
EXAMPLE OF PAN-TERRITORIAL PRICE DISTORTIONS
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The production of higher-value crops is reduced, thus reducing agricultural 
output, GNP, and growth. In many instances, these higher value crops play an 
important role in saving or earning foreign currency, thus furthering the negative 
impact of uniform prices on the supply of foreign currency. The most important 
constraint to growth in Zimbabwe is access to foreign currency.
Theoretical impacts on equity
Pan-territorial prices are defended on equity grounds, since it is assumed that 
incomes will be less differentiated if farmers in remote regions are paid the same 
prices as farmers close to markets. This ignores the price differentials which woqld 
exist for surplus and deficit areas. It would hold true only if all fanners were 
endowed with the same natural resources, abilities, and tastes. Given differences, 
there are regions where maize would be surplus to local requirements and these 
surpluses sold to urban areas and deficit regions. In a free market, prices would 
reflect the transport costs of either "importing" or "exporting" a commodity. These 
social prices are given in blocks on the diagram (Figure 1).
Producer prices would be higher in deficit areas, thus increasing incomes. Where 
people in remote surplus areas have higher total incomes (subsistence and cash) than 
those in deficit areas, the pan-territorial prices will have a negative impact on equity. 
At the same time, where wealthy, surplus farmers are located close to distribution 
centres, the uniform prices implicitly tax these farmers in favour of remote surplus 
producers. In these circumstances equity may be promoted. In Zimbabwe most 
of the direct transfer is between taxpayers and remote surplus farmers with most of 
the implicit transfers being between deficit area and surplus area farmers. The 
actual impact of pan-territorial prices on equity can only be determined empirically.
Theoretical impacts on food self-sufficiency and employment
National self-sufficiency may be achieved by subsidising transport in remote surplus 
regions, thus encouraging greater maize production and sales to the marketing 
board. Regional or district self-sufficiency is, however, very much lower with pan­
territorial prices. It has been shown that regional differentials reflecting comparative 
advantage would result in higher producer prices in deficit areas. Local prices would 
reflect the cost of transporting the maize from surplus areas. Producers in deficit 
areas would be offered higher prices, which would encourage local production. 
Local production (self-sufficiency) of maize in deficit areas is economic, up to the 
point where it becomes cheaper to import from surplus areas. Thus, despite poor 
agronomic conditions which result in lower yields and higher risks, if the demand for 
maize is high then it pays farmers in a marginal region to grow maize, provided they 
can produce the maize at a price no more than the cost of purchasing and 
transporting it from a surplus area. This is in direct contradilion to the advice given 
by many agriculturalists who prefer to see production directed by criteria governing 
supply alone. Demand, however, is equally important in determining both 
comparative advantage and equilibrium prices which in turn affect local food self- 
sufficiency.
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Uniform prices distort production patterns by encouraging high-bulk, low-value 
commodities in remote areas. If the commodities which are discouraged are more 
labour-intensive, then pan-territorial prices have a negative impact on employment. 
In Zimbabwe these commodities (tobacco, groundnuts, cotton) are all labour- 
intensive.
Experience from Tanzania and Zambia
Efforts were made in Zambia after independence to introduce regional pricing for 
maize so that surplus areas received a lower price and deficit regions a higher price. 
However, in 1970-71, however, uniform district prices were introduced and in 1974 
uniform local depot prices were established. Although designed to increase equity, 
the policy increased rural differentiation and implicitly taxed Western Province 
farmers (the poorest in Zambia). The increased transport requirements have 
contributed to the large losses incurred by NAMBOARD and the marketing 
cooperatives (Dodge, 1977).
In Tanzania prior to 1975, only the transport costs from regional centres to 
distribution centres were subsidised. When the cooperative societies were abolished 
in favour of state marketing boards, the villages themselves served as procurement 
points-introducing a significant transport subsidy to the more remote regions and 
villages. The transport of maize from the southwest cost Tsh40 million in 1980, 
whereas sales of the same maize generated less than Tsh 36 million (Keeler et al., 
1982). Ndulu (1980), in a simulated study of the situation in four regions, 
convincingly showed that in 1975-76 and 1976-77, without the interregional transport 
subsidy policy implied by uniform prices, supplies of maize would have been greater. 
As the response would have come from low transport-cost regions, there would 
have been a net social saving. The government introduced regional pricing 
differentials for maize in 1981, but instead of lowering producer prices in remote 
surplus regions they have increased them. This is directly contrary to the principle 
of efficiency pricing' and exaggerated the misallocation of resources. It was done 
in order to discourage maize production in the drier regions which are subject to 
crop failures and, although unstated, is because the more remote areas have a much 
higher official price elasticity since the high transport costs do not make parallel 
markets worthwhile. Suzuki and Bernard (1987) maintain that while the policy 
resulted in "huge financial deficits" the opportunity costs of growing high:bulk maize 
in the southern highlands (and thus resource misallocation) is low because of the 
problems which are associated with growing tobacco, assumed to be the only 
alternative crop. They also assume that poorer people are located in the southern 
highlands. Therefore, the authors maintain that the dramatic spatial swing in maize 
production accords with both growth and equity in Tanzania. Even if these 
assumptions arc valid, there is insufficient evidence presented to prove that the policy 
accords with cither growth or equity.
Evidence from Zimbabwe
When Zimbabwe moved away from regional prices to the use of average uniform 
into-depot prices, the "intent was lor consumers in production areas to subsidize
those in deficit areas, while at the same time encouraging production in areas more 
suitable for maize production by giving them a higher effective return than to 
producers in marginal areas" (GMB, 1987). This is extremely inequitable since 
incomes are related to price times yield. Therefore, it is unfair to pay farmers who 
receive half a tonne per hectare the same as those who receive five tonnes per 
hectare, in the name of equity. In general, areas with an absolute agronomic 
advantage in producing a particular commodity (high yield areas) will continue to be 
the major producers. However, any policy which pays farmers in deficit ardas less 
than the price of purchasing and transporting that maize from the surplus areas will 
reduce both growth and equity. The only instance in which it makes sense to pay 
farmers in high-yielding zones more than those in low-yielding zones is if the 
commodity has no demand in the low-yielding zone. In a free market, the situation 
would not arise since a low demand would mean that the price would not be high 
enough to result in production when yields are low.
Maize is widely grown and is the staple food in all farm communities, but 91% 
all marketed output in 1987 came from NR II. Almost all the farmers outside this 
area are penalised by the uniform price system. Despite a considerably smaller 
urban population, sales from Bulawayo exceeded those from Harare in 1986 and 
were only slightly lower in 1987. This indicates the much greater demand from the 
rural and smaller urban centres in that region.
Transport is a major factor in GMB deficits and, in particular, to the very 
considerable deficits on the maize account. The removal of pan-territorial pricing 
would significantly reduce this deficit.
An empirical example is presented below, using data for Magunje in 
Mashonaland West and Nkayi in Matabeleland North to indicate the consequences 
of the uniform into-depot prices (pan-territorial) in Zimbabwe. In 19876 20,000 mt 
of maize were transfered from Magunje to Bulawayo (Table 6). The example uses 
actual transport costs shown in Figure 1.
Equity impact
Under the uniform price system of Z$180/mt, the gross revenue in Magunje is 
Z$540/ha, whereas it is Z$90/ha for Nkayi. Assuming that people in Nkayi are 
poorer than those in Magunje, this does not accord with equity. A regional price 
differential reflecting transport to or from Bulawayo, would mean a price of 
Z$138.50/mt in Magunje and Z$244/mt in Nkayi. This will still leave farmers in 
the better agronomic zones with higher returns, but it would reduce the differential 
since Magunje farmers would now get Z$415.5/ha and Nkayi farmers Z$122/ha. 
Figure 1 shows the impact if Magunje farmers pay the full costs of transport to 
Nkayi.
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6The harvest year, which represents the 1986-87 growing year and the 1987-88 marketing year.
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Table 6. Illustrative impact of pan-territorial and regional prices in two areas of 
Zimbabwe, 1987.
Magunje (NR II) Nkayi (NR IV)
GMB
Total intake (mt) 28,900 USOO
Amount distributed 20,000* local only"
Grain price (Z$/mt) under:
Uniform pricing 180.00 180.00
Regional pricing 13830° 244.00d
Yield (mt/ha) 3.0 0.5
Gross returns (Z$/ha) under:
Uniform pricing6 540.00 90.00
Regional pricing1 41550 122.00
Value of grain (Z$):
Uniform pricing* 3,600,000 270,000
Regional pricing1' 2,770,000 366,000
Impact1
GMB (Z$y‘ loss -830,000 gain 96,000
Social losses (Z$)lm 
Farmer (Z$/mt)“
loss -1,411,000 loss -765,000
subsidy 4150 subsidy -64.00
^Transferred from Magunje to Bulawayo. 
bNo grain transferred out of depot.
‘Computed as uniform price minus transport cost. 
dG>mputed as uniform price plus transport cost.
‘Computed as yield times uniform price.
'Computed as yield times regional price.
•Computed as uniform price times amount distributed for Magunje; and uniform price times total 
intake for Nkayi.
hComputed as regional price times amount distributed for Magunje; and regional price times total 
intake for Nkayi.
'Depot to destination route is Magunje to Bulawayo, and Nkayi from Bulawayo which assumes Nkai 
is a deficit area importing from Bulawayo.
'Excludes supply response to price which would result in higher GMB and social losses from uniform 
prices.
“GMB losses are the costs to the GMB of paying uniform prices for maize.
'Only includes opportunity cost of foreign currency in transport (assuming 70% foreign content worth 
more by a factor of 2). A very crude estimate that makes the unlikely assumption that with regional 
pricing, deficit areas become self-sufficient. However, the resource misallocation impact on commodity 
and input mixes is not included in the estimate.
"Social losses arc the cost to the nation due to transport distortions.
"farmer cost is the implicit transport tax/subsidy or the difference between what the farmer would get 
if regional prices were introduced, using actual costs of transport from Magunje to Bulawayo and 
Z$O.I5/km/mt to Nkayi.
Source: GMB lenders and personal communications.
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Fiscal impact
GMB currently absorb all the transport costs from depot to various zone centres. 
The Z$830,000 implicit loss to government from uniform prices on the 20,000 mt 
transfered from Magunje assumes that if regional pricing were introduced, farmers 
would bear transport costs and that these areas would continue to be major 
suppliers.
Crude estimates of actual fiscal losses from the uniform price policy can be made. 
Assume that 80% of Bulawayo supplies currently come from the maize surplus 
regions, but that this drops to 60% after regional pricing is introduced; savings on 
Bulawayo maize sales from the introduction of regional producer pricing would have 
been approximately Z$8 million in 1987. This figure cannot be accurately estimated 
without price elasticities of supply in the different regions.
Efficiency (growth) impact
It would be useful to calculate the net savings to the nation from reduced transport 
demand and better resource allocation. Given some very rough estimations and 
limiting assumptions, the social costs of uniform prices-with respect to Bulawayo in 
1987—were in the region of ZS40 million.
This assumes that there would be a 50% reduction in the surplus production 
from remote areas (159,000 mt) and an equivalent increase from the Bulawayo 
region resulting in a Z$10 million saving on transport with foreign currency 
component and shadow rate as given above. It assumes that 50% of the reduced 
maize comes from remote commercial farms (13,250 ha) and is replaced by tobacco 
and fallow, while the other 50% comes from communal and resettled farmers (26,500 
ha) and is replaced by cotton and groundnuts. Using social profitability per hectare 
from O’Driscoll and Takavarasha(1988), the opportunity cost of the pan-territorial 
maize price on resource allocation is calculated using the formula: area planted to 
new crop(s) times social return per hectare less social value of replaced maize (see 
Appendix 1).
Basic supply response studies for the commercial sector do exist and more 
accurate estimates of response in that sector are possible, but there is very little 
information available for the communal sector. The calculations in Appendix 1 are 
used for illustrative purposes only.
Similar calculations could be made for the impact on employment and food self- 
sufficiency. It is obvious from the evidence presented that uniform into-depot prices 
are inimical to growth and that with respect to producers in deficit areas, inimical 
to equity. The impact of transfers between surplus producers remote from and close 
to markets and between deficit area and surplus area consumers have not been 
estimated.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Partial decontrol of the market would reduce the inefficiencies arising from costs of 
production, pan-seasonal and pan-territorial pricing. Government could continue to 
both stabilise prices and maintain buffer stocks to achieve food self-sufficiency.
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Although there would still be costs associated with maize self-sufficiency, these 
would be reduced as the government would purchase when prices were low and sell 
when they are high. Producers would be asssured of a minimum price which covers 
variable costs and consumers would be protected from exhorbitant price rises in 
drought years (Child, Muir, and Blackie, 1985).
Where governments prefer to continue with full state control, the negative conse­
quences for growth, equity, and employment can be reduced by institutionalising 
economic analysis of policy impacts. It is possible to reduce pricing inefficiencies, 
or at least measure the cost and, therefore, make informed decisions. Another 
suggestion is that marketing parastatals should be allowed to distinguish in their cost 
accounting between commercial functions and those which are social operations 
undertaken on behalf of government-strategic grain reserves and low food prices for 
consumers (Coopers & Lybrand, 1988). To do this, opportunity cost prices for both 
producers and consumers must be established.
A preliminary analysis of the efficiency impact of different price policies has been 
carried out by O’Driscoll and Takavarasha (1988), showing where current prices for 
outputs and inputs differ from social prices. An investigation of the comparative 
advantage of wheat (Morris, 1988) also includes some domestic resource cost (DRC) 
analysis of other irrigated crops. It is recommended that such analysis is 
institutionalised and that a major preliminary study be undertaken to determine 
comparative advantage for the various regions and farming systems.
Domestic resource cost ratios (DRCs) are a measure of the local resources 
required to earn or save one unit of foreign currency. The policy analysis matrix, 
used to determine a DRC, provides a good framework for analysing policies. The 
impacts of government policies can be measured in efficiency terms; and the results 
can indicate which commodities should be promoted to maximize growth. At the 
same time, if policymakers decide to vary prices to achieve other objectives (c.g., 
equity, food self-sufficiency employment, or soil conservation), to (he extent that 
there is a trade-off with growth, it can be measured. DRC analysis measures 
comparative advantage and will reflect well for those commodities and technologies 
Which rely on Zimbabwe’s abundant resources in the production process. It is 
unlikely that any one DRC study will produce precisely the same results as another 
study, since they depend on the data used and social price estimates. It is, however, 
the relative results which are important since these will signal which commodities 
have the greatest comparative advantage in saving or earning foreign currency.
It is further recommended that border prices, adjusted to reflect the value of 
foreign exchange, be used as the basis for setting price for all commodities except 
maize. These prices can then be modified in response to lobbies or to achieve other 
goals and the impacts can be measured. It is difficult to decide whether to use 
export or import parity for maize. This presents a particular problem since the high 
bridging costs result in severe losses, both for exports and imports. A number of 
suggestions have been made which amount to setting the price half way between 
world export and import parity (Muir-Leresche, 1984) or at regional export parity 
(O’Driscoll and Takavarasha, l'>88).
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While pan-seasonal prices for maize do have some impact on parastatal deficits 
and partial decontrol will reduce these, the impact is minor compared to the cost of 
the reserve stocks necessary to reduce interseasonal fluctuations. From the social 
welfare perspective, it is uncertain that on-farm storage would be cheaper than 
centralised storage with its greater economies of size. Peasant farmers already store 
grains used for all home consumption during the year and usually prefer to sell any 
marketable surplus as soon as possible. The administrative costs of setting the prices 
at the correct levels to induce the desired on-farm storage of marketable surpluses 
would be considerable and the returns are unlikely to warrant their establishment at 
this stage. As the peasant sector becomes more specialised and more closely 
integrated in the market, this may change. Preparation can be made for this 
development by building the capacity to establish reasonably accurate supply and 
demand elasticities.
Pan-territorial pricing, on the other hand, has a major impact on both the 
marketing board deficits and the economy with negative impacts on both growth and 
equity. Where central government finances all transport costs, all surplus farmers 
benefit and farmers in remote surplus areas gain the most. To the extent that they 
are poorer, this will accord with equity but at an enormous social cost as previously 
demonstrated. Uniform prices act as an implicit tax on deficit area farmers, 
suppressing their locational advantages. Thus, uniform prices are contrary to both 
growth and equity, where these farmers are poorer than farmers in suri is areas. 
The authors strongly recommend that government introduce regional producer prices 
for maize which more closely approximate opportunity costs.
While it would be difficult to establish regional prices which exactly reflect 
opportunity costs, it is possible to set prices which take into account some of the 
transport costs. In the first instance, this could be done by establishing prices at 
surplus area depots which reflect transport costs to the nearest zone centre (i.e., 
NRII/III farmers would bear the cost of transport to Harare or Mutare. GMB 
would still bear the additional cost of transport to deficit areas. Using the example 
in Figure 1, Magunje farmers would be paid Z$150/mt using this formula. 
Theoretically, the price should reflect transport costs to the main deficit region 
(Bulawayo), but initially it may be politically difficult to make such a sharp 
differential. If surplus production and exports continue to make losses, removing 
more of this subsidy should then be considered.
Deficit area farmers, however, should be paid the full cost of transporting the 
maize from surplus areas. Thus, they should be paid the f.o.r. Harare price plus 
transport from Harare. Given the low yields in these areas, it is unlikely that they 
will significantly increase output. But they should be encouraged to be self-sufficient 
up to the point where it becomes cheaper to import from other regions.
It is also considerably fairer—given that income is equal to price times yield-to 
pay farmers in low-yielding areas more than those in high-yielding areas. It would 
be expensive to growth to pay them more than the opportunity cost of importing 
maize from surplus areas, but it is inimical to both growth and equity to pay them 
less. Theoretically, they should be paid the depot price plus transport costs from the 
furthest surplus region and it may be possible to do this. At a minimum, they should
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be paid the depot price plus transport costs from Harare. The calculation of these 
transport rates should not reflect the subsidised rail rates which the earlier analysis 
does. Thus, the deficit area price would be higher than that reflected in the 
example.
CONCLUSION
It is possible for governments to considerably increase the efficiency of marketing 
parastatals without changing their structure. While a number of specified goals may 
take precedence over growth and foreign currency earnings, it is important for 
policymakers to be aware of the impacts of any policies designed to achieve these 
goals and to choose the least-cost path. Financial and economic values differ. 
Whenever possible, it is important that price signals maximise social welfare through 
rational resource allocation. Implicit taxes or subsidies do not imply that farmers 
are making losses or excessive profits, but that they are being paid too little or too 
much to ensure the best possible choice of outputs and inputs. This movement away 
from economically optimum resource allocation may be necessary to achieve other 
goals. Therefore, it may be desirable to subsidise farmers by paying prices above 
world prices. On the other hand, some policies (e.g. uniform prices) are highly 
distortive and a way to implement regional prices which more closely approximate 
opportunity cost should be found.
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Appendix 1:
Assuming commercial farmers take 13,250 ha to produce 79,500 mt (6mt/ha) of 
maize; and they replace maize with 6,625 ha of tobacco (Z$ 5,423/ha) and leave 
6,625 ha fallow--the opportunity cost on commercial farms is computed as: 
Z$35,927,375 added value of tobacco (6,625 ha tobacco x Z$5,423/ha) minus 
Z$9,672,500 (13,250 ha maize x Z$730) in reduced maize value, for a net charge of 
Z$26,254,875.
Assuming communal farmers take 26,500 ha to produce 79,500 mt (3mt/ha in 
NRII); and they replace the maize with 13,250 ha of cotton (Z$422/ha) plus 13,250 
ha of groundnuts (Z$655/ha)-the opportunity cost on communal farms is computed 
as: the Z$5,591,500 (13,250 ha cotton x Z$ 422/ha) in added value of cotton, plus 
Z$8,678,750 (13,250 ha groundnuts x Z$655/ha) in added value of groundnuts, minus 
Z$9,434,000 (26,500 ha maize x Z$356/ha) in reduced value of maize, for a net 
charge of Z$4,836,250. The commercial plus and communal opportunity cost is 
approximately Z$31 million, plus Z$10 million due to reduced transport costs, for a 
total opportunity cost of approximately Z$41 million.
Note: The social returns/ha used in this analysis were calculated by O’Driscoll and 
Takavarasha (1988).
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